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Code of Ethics Revisited 
Over two years ago, I filled these pages 
with an analysis of the newly-approved 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Maryland which had been adopted in 
April of 1986 by the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland. (17.1 U. Balt. L. Forum 31 
(1986)). Although disciplinary actions 
involving the Model Rules have only 
recently begun to appear in the Advance 
Sheets, the application of the Model Rules 
to the everyday practice of law has already 
been felt. Despite the absence of court 
decisions, lawyers are determining the 
parameters of their conduct by the Model 
Rules. Another look at some of the Rules, 
therefore, may be of value. 
The first provision which has impacted 
upon the practitioner with significant 
force is Rule 1.5 dealing with fees. 
Although the language waffles a bit, the 
intent is to place on the individual attor-
ney the burden of implementing a fair and 
reasonable system of charging fees which 
he must communicate to the client in such 
a way that the client comprehends and 
agrees to the system. Although Rule 1.5 
draws a dichotomy between the new client 
and the former client, the burden is the 
same. At a minimum, whether the client is 
an existing one or a new one, the lawyer 
should present a written document which 
spells out the method by which the fee will 
be charged, the time frame during which 
the fee is to be charged, the services which 
are included and excluded, and the obliga-
tion(s) as to costs and monies due at the 
outset. It is shortsighted for a lawyer today 
to deal with any client without a written 
fee document. 
An additional concern, also found 10 
by Professor William I. Weston 
Rule 1.5, is whether the lawyer may con-
sider the results of his representation of the 
client in setting his or her fees, (hereinafter 
referred to as "result orientation"). 
Increasingly, lawyers for both defendants 
and plaintiffs are abandoning the tradi-
tional approach of the hourly rate in favor 
of a combination of hourly rate and result 
orientation. The consideration of results 
obtained in setting a fee is permitted by the 
Model Rules - as long as the total fee is 
reasonable. Although there are some situa-
tions in which result orientation rewards 
competence and hard work above and 
beyond the ordinary, there is legitimate 
concern that result orientation will 
become the normal and accepted way of 
setting fees. Moreover, the use of result 
orientation in setting a fee brings into 
clash the words of the Model Rules and the 
concepts of professionalism. The danger in 
such an approach is that result orientation 
gives the lawyer a piece of the action. 
Instead of maintaining an objective and 
detached view of the case, the lawyer 
becomes an interested party, protecting his 
or her own interests as much as that of the 
client. The lawyer must serve as the facili-
tator of the entrusted legal matter and not 
as the dealer in a card game. 
The incentive to achieve a good result 
should exist irrespective of the financial 
gain; and, if there is any extraordinary 
gain, it should benefit the client. Rule 1.5 
says the lawyer is entitled to a reasonable 
fee for his or her efforts. There is nothing 
wrong with a lawyer being paid a reason-
able bonus for an extraordinary achieve-
ment. The major beneficiary of a positive 
result, however, should remain the client. 
Fees charged and collected under Model 
Rule 1.5 for the referral of a client contin-
ue to be a serious concern to lawyers and 
to the Bar. Pennsylvania and Texas have 
modified their version of the Model Rules 
to permit charging and collecting a referral 
fee. Maryland does not permit collection' 
of referral fees. The rule prohibiting refer-
ral fees comes from a combination of the 
rules governing reasonable fees and lawyer 
responsibility. A lawyer who is not 
responsible for the case or who has not 
shared in the work involved in the case is 
not entitled to share in the fee collected. 
To do so would render the fee unreasona-
ble. For example, if the second lawyer may 
pay the first lawyer up to one-third of the 
fee collected only for the act of referring 
the case, without any work or responsibili-
ty, then the fee being charged the client is 
too high - probably one-third too high. 
According to the Supreme Court, lawyer-
ing is in the free flow of commercial infor-
mation (Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
U.S. 350 (1977)); however, nothing in the 
Supreme Court opinion(s) suggest that 
professionalism and the placing of the 
client ahead of the greed of the attorney 
are inconsistent with commercial activities 
by an attorney. 
The second provision of the Model 
Rules which is troublesome is Maryland's 
version of Model Rule 1.6. Specifically, 
section 1.6 (b)(1) and (2) provide that a 
lawyer "may" reveal information which 
the lawyer believes necessary to prevent 
the client from committing a criminal or 
fraudulent act that the lawyer believes will 
result in death, substantial bodily harm, or 
substantial injury to the financial interests 
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or property of another. ("Information" is 
the new term of art replacing "confi-
dences" and "secrets" in the old Model 
Code). Subsection (2) allows the lawyer to 
reveal information to rectify the conse-
quences of the client's criminal or fraudu-
lent act. 
While the goal of revealing information 
to avoid bodily harm or economic harm is 
noble, the vehicle chosen is incorrect. The 
terms are ill-defined and unclear. What, for 
example, is a fraudulant act? Is the act 
violative of criminal fraud, civil fraud, or 
some yet-to-be-defined notion of fraud? 
What is "substantial injury to the financial 
interests of property of another?" From 
what perspective is that phrase drawn and, 
if it is from the lawyer's perspective, how 
does he or she have the information neces-
sary to makt; a conclusion that "another" 
is to undergo substantial injury to his or 
her financial interest of property. 
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of Cali-
fornia, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) was a case where it 
was necessary to reveal information to 
"another." There, a psychologist failed to 
take sufficient steps to warn his patient's 
girlfriend that the patient intended to kill 
her. The fact that the psychologist contact-
ed the campus police did not extricate him 
from his responsibility to the third party. 
In the case of possible death or bodily 
harm, the decision to reveal information is 
a bit easier to make and the stakes involved 
do demand a balanced approach. When 
considering economic harm, however, the 
risks to the attorney are enormous. 
For an attorney to believe that he may 
break the most sacred of his fiduciary 
duties, confidentiality, to avoid the occur-
rence of this type of economic injury con-
stitutes a lack of understanding of the 
nature of his duties. Only in the most com-
pelling circumstances should an attorney 
reveal information. Possible economic 
harm can never be equated to serious bodi-
ly injury or death and, hence, should not 
give an attorney ground for disclosure. In 
addition, the attorney is placed in the posi-
tion of making all of the judgment_ He 
"may" reveal the information that he 
"reasonably believes" is necessary to avoid 
death or the economic harm which he "be-
lieves" will result. Upon reading the lan-
guage in Rule 1.6, one understands why no 
other state has chosen to adopt the strict 
version of this rule. 
Rule 1.6 is impossible to apply and to 
enforce and it gives the attorney no guid-
ance as to how to determine what he or 
she may reveal. When faced with the alter-
natives of revealing information to prevent 
serious economic harm and the potential 
of a malpractice and/or grievance action, 
the reasonable attorney will opt for 
silence. Maryland does not recognize the 
holding in Tarasoff, supra; see Shaw v. 
Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718, 415 A.2d 625 
(1980). Thus, the potential liability for fail-
ure to disclose is not present in Maryland. 
It is well-intentioned for a lawyer to desire 
to reveal conduct which would result in 
serious economic harm, however, the 
risks, burdens, and lack of guidance implic-
it in this section make the revealing of this 
type of information impossible. 
The third provision which has under-
gone further analysis since last year is Rule 
7.1 relating to advertising. The most recent 
"Only in the most 
compelling 
circumstances should 
an attorney reveal 
information" 
case addressing this issue is Shapero v. 
Kentucky Bar Assoc., __ U.S. __ , 108 S. 
Ct. 1916 (1988) Although Shapero dealt 
with targeted direct mail advertising, the 
language of the decision moves away from 
the Bar's attempt to limit advertising 
beyond what is inherently misleading or 
deceptive in fact. In Shapero, the attorney 
had applied to the Attorney Advertising 
Commission for permission to send a 
letter to persons he believed had had 
foreclosure suits filed against them. The 
Commission did not find the letter to be 
offensive, but did rule that a letter sent to 
people in need of an attorney's services 
was not constitutionally protected speech. 
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed 
the decision; but the United States 
Supreme Court reversed. The Court 
further ruled that the letters were not 
overwhelming so as to put pressure on the 
recipient and, in fact, no form of written 
communication presents that type of 
danger. 
Although advertising will be subject to 
review by the courts through the Attorney 
Grievance Commission, the clear message 
of the Court is that advertising is protected 
commercial speech and regulation of it by 
the states must be limited to those 
situations where the advertising 1S 
misleading or deceptive. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland in Attorney 
Grievance Comm'n v. McCloskey, 306 Md. 
677, 511 A.2d 56 (1987) required that proof 
of misleading evidence must be clear and 
convincing and that someone has actually 
been misled. 
The purpose of advertising is to bring to 
the public's attention the availability of 
legal services and to make them aware of 
legal rights which may be afforded to 
them. There is, therefore, an important 
public component to advertising which 
cannot be lightly dismissed. That public 
component, coupled with constitutional 
guarantees regarding commercial speech, 
render proscriptions regarding advertising 
by the Maryland Bar or any bar very 
limited. Moreover, of the types of 
advertising which are least intrusive and 
hence subject to less scrutiny, newspaper 
advertising will receive greater protection 
than will television advertising. 
Many lawyers object to advertising on 
the grounds of dignity, professionalism, 
and the actual content of the 
advertisement. The concept of advertising 
does not mean that all advertisements are 
palatable to all people. Like most other 
types of protected speech, however, the 
right of the speaker overcomes issues of 
dignity and professionalism. Zauderer v. 
O/Jue of Disciplinary Counsel of the 
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 
(1985). Perhaps it is time for the Bar to 
retreat from its efforts to draw a bright 
line regarding advertising and to 
commence affirmative acts to encourage 
quality, competent, and clear advertising 
which is clearly within the spirit and letter 
of Model Rules 7.1-7.3. 
The fourth provision of increasing 
concern today is Rule 3.1 and its 
application concerning frivolous claims. 
This rule is the successor to Disciplinary 
Rule 7-102 (A)(l) of the old Code. Model 
Rule 1.3 approaches the issue of frivolous 
claims from the perspective of good faith 
by stating that the lawyer should not move 
forward on a case absent the existence of a 
good faith argument in support of the 
client's position. This is a significant 
improvement over the predecessor 
Disciplinary Rule which defined the issue 
of frivolous claims by the "purpose behind 
the litigation." The purpose could not be 
to harass or injure another. The prior 
Model Code reviewed frivolous claims 
from the perspective of the attorney ("if 
the lawyer knows or it is obvious"), rather 
than the more sound approach (an 
objective standard) taken by the Model 
Rules. 
Rule 3.1 has not been the subject of 
litigation. In light of the increasing 
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application of Maryland Rule 1-341, how-
ever, which "punishes" attorneys for 
bringing a case without substantial justifi-
cation, the wisdom of the need for both 
rules is in question. Rule 1-341 gives to the 
trial judge broad powers to determine, 
after the fact, whether the case is "frivo-
lous." The increasing misapplication of 
the rule by judges on their own motion, 
however, is problematic. In addition, the 
application of this rule obligates the "of-
fending attorney" to expend considerable 
time and expense fighting the allegation(s) 
and often having to appeal them. All of 
this is conducted without the protections 
afforded by the Attorney Grievance Com-
mission and Rule 3.1. 
It is without question that there are friv-
olous cases and attorneys who bring mat-
ters without substantial justification. 
Model Rule 3.1, however, provides more 
than adequate protection to the court and 
the legal system in a controlled setting, 
guaranteeing constitutionally protected 
liberties. There are dangers if the same 
judge who is hearing or has heard the case 
also is assigned to determine if the case was 
"frivolous." Moreover, that judge makes 
his or her decision without the opportuni-
ty of cool reflection and detachment as 
provided by the Commission. No one ben-
efits from the continuing and broad 
application of Rule 1-341 in lieu of the 
existing Model Rule. 
The final provision concerning ethical 
conduct facing lawyers today is the 
application of Model Rule 6.1 concerning 
pro bono service. Without belaboring an 
already well-covered topic, the language of 
the Rule already provides a vehicle for 
public service. Two things are needed for 
better successes in this area: first, increas-
ing public awareness of what is already 
provided by attorneys and, second, a law-
yer awareness program to increase the 
delivery of pro bono services. The reality 
is that most lawyers already provide some 
type of pro bono legal services. These serv-
ices could be done by not billing a client, 
or by accepting cases from legal services 
agencies. Attempts to expand the language 
and meaning of Rule 6.1 will not alter the 
current commitment of attorneys to the 
delivery of legal services. 
The extent and application of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct will be real-
ized to a greater degree over the coming 
year as the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
is called upon to interpret specific lan-
guage. The Model Rules do address many 
of the linguistic problems that its predeces-
sors had. This is significant. What is need-
ed now are cautious, detached reviews of 
the provisions which are being applied to 
specific cases so that the modifications 
which occur to the plain meaning of the 
written words do not result in a document 
substantially different from that originally 
approved. 
Professor William I. Weston is a faculty 
member at the University of Baltimore 
School of Law. He is a member of the 
Maryland and D.C Bars. Prior to joining 
the faculty he served as Bar Grievance 
Administrative and Executive Director of 
the Bar Association of Baltimore City. 
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